

REPORT NO.

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SUPPLEMENT TO  
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. Numerous economic discussions took place during the first part of May 1951 in the Politburo of the SED. The basis for these discussions was the assumption that sooner or later any legal or illegal access to western raw materials may be closed.
2. [redacted] shipments from the West to the DDR and to the Soviet Union, even though they had been only slightly decreased during the last year, would not suffice to meet the goals set by the present economic plans. Walter Ulbricht added that all possible loop-holes for East-West trade ought to be exploited and widened.
3. [redacted] advised the other members of the Politburo concerning the extensive declarations and plans of the Western Powers to control East-West trade. Ulbricht stated that such statements are employed as a means of political manoeuvre. Ulbricht said that the Soviets have lists of firms in the West (in Western Europe as well as the United States) which owe their large profits to this legal and illegal East-West trade. This trade has taken on such important proportions that its discontinuance would adversely affect a large portion of Western trade and industry. The great attraction in this type of trade lies in its unofficial nature which offers extraordinary opportunities for profiteering.
4. A much more serious note was struck by the Politburo on the subject of the Schuman Plan. The Soviets are of the opinion that the Schuman Plan, should it ever become a reality, would definitely remove Western Germany and Western Europe from the grasp of the Soviet Union. In this connection, the Soviet Union has only recently come to realize the importance of the Schuman Plan. Until a short time ago, the Soviets had accepted that analysis of the SED which maintained that the Schuman Plan was so plainly inspired by French interests that the trade unions and industry of Western Germany would combine to prevent its approval or application. In the opinion of the SED the opposition of Great Britain would do the rest.
5. The acceptance of the Schuman Plan by the German Federal Republic and by the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund came as a great surprise to the Soviets. Kurt Schmied's opposition to the plan caused the SED Politburo, on Soviet instruction, once again to study the possibility of concerted action with the SPD. Although this problem was discussed at great length, no ideas were advanced for making an approach to the SPD leaders. The SED Politburo, however, hopes that the two propaganda projects: "Against Remilitarization" and "Against the Schuman Plan" will mobilize the rank and file of the Western German SED as an auxiliary force for Communist aims in the Federal Republic in spite of the opposition of the SPD leadership.

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